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TESTIMONY OF



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BEFORE THE *Subcommittee on Investigations*
of the House Committee on Armed Services
~~HOUSE ARMED SERVICES INVESTIGATIVE SUBCOMMITTEE~~

CONCERNING THE USE OF THE
POLYGRAPH AT THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

6 SEPTEMBER 1984

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MR. CHAIRMAN, MY NAME IS I AM THE
DIRECTOR OF SECURITY FOR THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, A
POSITION I HAVE HELD SINCE 1980. PRIOR TO THAT I HELD VARIOUS
SECURITY POSITIONS SINCE JOINING THE AGENCY IN 1951. I BEGAN
MY CAREER AT THE AGENCY AS A POLYGRAPH EXAMINER.

I AM HERE TODAY TO EXPLAIN HOW WE USE THE POLYGRAPH
INTERVIEW AT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) AS AN
INTEGRAL AND VITAL PART OF OUR OVERALL SECURITY PROGRAM. WE
WANT TO MAKE THREE IMPORTANT POINTS:

FIRST, AS DEMONSTRATED THROUGH THIRTY SIX YEARS OF
EXPERIENCE AT THE CIA, THE POLYGRAPH INTERVIEW IS THE SINGLE
MOST EFFECTIVE TOOL IN DEVELOPING AND VERIFYING
SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION;

SECOND, THE SUCCESS OF THE AGENCY'S POLYGRAPH PROGRAM IS
BASED NOT ONLY ON POLYGRAPH QUESTIONS BUT ALSO UPON DISCUSSIONS
CONCERNING THOSE QUESTIONS;

THIRD, THE AGENCY'S POLYGRAPH PROGRAM IS FAIR AND PROVIDES
AN APPROPRIATE BALANCE BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHTS AND THE
NEED TO PROTECT THE NATIONAL SECURITY.

THE AGENCY'S INITIAL EXPOSURE TO THE POLYGRAPH CAME IN 1948
WHEN THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, ADMIRAL
HILLENKOETER, AUTHORIZED A STUDY OF ITS POSSIBLE VALUE IN
PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, USING AGENCY VOLUNTEERS AS
SUBJECTS. AT THE CLOSE OF 1948, 123 PERSONS HAD BEEN TESTED
AND THE UTILITY OF THE TECHNIQUE WAS IMMEDIATELY DEMONSTRATED.

SPECIFICALLY, SIGNIFICANT PERSONNEL SECURITY INFORMATION NOT PREVIOUSLY KNOWN WAS DEVELOPED IN SO MANY CASES THAT IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION WAS UNIQUE AS A MECHANISM TO IDENTIFY SECURITY FACTORS NOT AVAILABLE FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE.

IN 1949, THE AGENCY BEGAN TO INVESTIGATE THE UTILITY OF THE POLYGRAPH IN CHECKING THE OPERATIONAL SECURITY STATUS OF FOREIGN AGENTS. HERE TOO, THE POLYGRAPH QUICKLY PROVED ITSELF TO BE INVALUABLE, AND BY 1952 THE AGENCY'S OPERATIONAL POLYGRAPH PROGRAM WAS IN EFFECT WORLDWIDE. THE OPERATIONAL POLYGRAPH PROGRAM RESPONDS TO INDIVIDUAL REQUESTS FROM THE AGENCY'S DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS FOR TESTING OF ITS AGENTS ON THEIR OPERATIONAL SECURITY STATUS OR ON ITEMS OF INFORMATION THEY PROVIDE.

IN 1953, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ALLEN DULLES REAFFIRMED USE OF THE POLYGRAPH AND FORMALIZED ITS UTILIZATION AS A ROUTINE AND REQUIRED PHASE OF THE SECURITY SCREENING OF APPLICANTS. OVER SUBSEQUENT YEARS, POLICY HAS BEEN REFINED PROGRESSIVELY WITH RESPECT TO WHO WILL BE TESTED, WHAT ISSUES WILL BE COVERED, AND HOW THE PROGRAM SHOULD BE ADMINISTERED.

DURING THE EARLY YEARS OF THE AGENCY'S POLYGRAPH PROGRAM, POLYGRAPH TRAINING ALTERNATED BETWEEN INTERNAL TRAINING EFFORTS AND TRAINING AT VARIOUS EXTERNAL SCHOOLS. SINCE NOVEMBER 1982, THE AGENCY HAS OPERATED ITS OWN POLYGRAPH SCHOOL FOR PURPOSES OF COST EFFECTIVENESS AND SPECIALLY TAILORED TRAINING. THE

SCHOOL HAS BEEN FORMALLY ACCREDITED BY THE AMERICAN POLYGRAPH ASSOCIATION. THE TRAINEES ARE CAREFULLY SELECTED AND TRAINED IN THE TECHNIQUES AND POLICIES THAT ARE UNIQUE TO THE NEEDS, EMPHASIS AND CONTROLS FEATURED IN THE CIA POLYGRAPH PROGRAM.

TODAY THE AGENCY'S POLYGRAPH PROGRAM IS RUN BY WELL-TRAINED AND CLOSELY-SUPERVISED EXAMINERS WHO HAVE HAD A SIX-MONTH PERIOD OF FORMAL TRAINING FOLLOWED BY AN INTERNSHIP FEATURING CLOSE SUPERVISION, MONITORING AND PERIODIC ATTENDANCE AT SEMINARS AND TECHNICAL MEETINGS. IN ADDITION TO NORMAL TECHNICAL POLYGRAPH TRAINING, AGENCY EXAMINERS RECEIVE INSTRUCTION FROM THE AGENCY'S OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE POLYGRAPH PROCESS.

IN THE INTEREST OF QUALITY CONTROL, NO INTERVIEW IS CONCLUDED UNTIL SUPERVISORY REVIEW OF POLYGRAPH CHARTS IS CONDUCTED, EXCEPT, OF COURSE, WHERE TESTING IS CONDUCTED IN THE FIELD WHERE IMMEDIATE SUPERVISORY REVIEW CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED.

ALL AGENCY POLYGRAPH EXAMINERS OPERATE WITHIN STRICT GUIDELINES THAT ENSURE THAT THE SUBJECT UNDERSTANDS THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE INTERVIEW, THE ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED, THE EXACT QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED, AND THE SUBJECT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN ALL OF THIS. ALL PROSPECTIVE INTERVIEWEES ARE PROTECTED BY AGENCY POLICY THAT REQUIRES THE SUBJECT'S CONSENT IN WRITING, THAT REQUIRES STRICT LIMITS ON DISSEMINATION OF POLYGRAPH-DERIVED INFORMATION AND THAT PROHIBITS POLYGRAPH TESTING WHEN IT APPEARS THAT SUCH TESTING MIGHT AGGRAVATE PHYSICAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS.

AT THIS TIME, POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OFFICE OF SECURITY'S POLYGRAPH DIVISION. DURING FISCAL YEARS 1982 AND 1983, APPROXIMATELY 60 PERCENT OF THE POLYGRAPH INTERVIEWS WERE CONDUCTED IN CONNECTION WITH PROCESSING FOR STAFF-LIKE ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. THE REMAINDER OF THE CASES WERE REINVESTIGATIONS CASES, INDUSTRIAL POLYGRAPH INTERVIEWS, OR OPERATIONAL POLYGRAPH INTERVIEWS.

THE AGENCY'S POLYGRAPH PROGRAM IS GEARED TO AN EXAMINATION OF THOSE PERSONNEL SECURITY FACTORS WHICH, OVER TIME, HAVE EMERGED AS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT IN TERMS OF THE THREAT TO AGENCY PERSONNEL, AGENCY FACILITIES, AND AGENCY CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. THE SCOPE OF TESTING CAN VARY FROM FULL COVERAGE OF SUCH ISSUES AS FOREIGN CONTACTS, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, MISUSE OR REVELATION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES, DRUG ABUSE AND EXTREME FINANCIAL VULNERABILITIES TO SPECIFIC-ISSUE TESTING ON INDIVIDUAL PROBLEM ISSUES OR ALLEGATIONS. THE BASIC TESTING FORMATS USED IN THE CIA POLYGRAPH PROGRAM ARE AS FOLLOWS:

FULL COVERAGE IS USED UPON THE ENTRANCE-ON-DUTY OF STAFF EMPLOYEES AND STAFF-LIKE ASSOCIATES (THE LATTER HAVE UNESCORTED ACCESS TO CIA FACILITIES).

THE SAME COVERAGE IS USED BEFORE COMPLETION OF THE TRIAL PERIOD OF NEW EMPLOYEES.

MORE FOCUSED COVERAGE AT PERIODIC INTERVALS
IS USED AS A PART OF ROUTINE REINVESTIGATION
OF STAFF EMPLOYEES.

SPECIFIC ISSUE TESTING OF EMPLOYEES IS USED
TO RESOLVE SPECIFIC SECURITY CONCERNS.

TAILORED EXAMINATIONS OF OPERATIONAL ASSETS
ARE USED IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE AGENCY'S
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING ACTIVITIES.

LIMITED COVERAGE IS USED TO TEST CERTAIN KEY
INDUSTRIAL CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL.

FOR OPERATIONAL CASES, THE EXAMINER CONSULTS WITH THE
REQUESTING COMPONENT OF THE DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS TO
DETERMINE WHAT ISSUES ARE TO BE COVERED AND THE QUESTIONS TO BE
ASKED. FOR ALL OTHER TYPES OF CASES, APPROPRIATE QUESTIONS ARE
DEVELOPED BY THE OFFICE OF SECURITY (OCCASIONALLY IN
CONSULTATION WITH ADVISORY BODIES SUCH AS THE COUNTERINTELLI-
GENCE STAFF AND THE INSPECTOR GENERAL). THIS IS TO ENSURE
COMPLETENESS AND UNIFORMITY OF COVERAGE FOR EACH TYPE OF
CASES. EXAMINERS ARE INSTRUCTED ON, AND MUST BE COMPLETELY
FAMILIAR WITH, THE TRUE INTENT AND MEANING OF THE QUESTIONS FOR
EACH TYPE OF CASE. UNIFORMITY OF PROCEDURE AND COVERAGE IS

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CRITICAL TO THE AGENCY'S POLYGRAPH PROGRAM, BOTH IN TERMS OF
EQUITABLE TREATMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND FOCUS ON LEGITIMATE
AREAS OF SECURITY INTEREST.

BEFORE ADDRESSING SOME OF THE CRITICISMS LEVELED AT THE
POLYGRAPH, I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT THE POLYGRAPH IS
ESSENTIAL TO DETERMINING THE SECURITY SUITABILITY OF
APPLICANTS AND EMPLOYEES. THE GRANTING OF A CLEARANCE OR A
SECURITY APPROVAL BY THE AGENCY REQUIRES A TOTAL ASSESSMENT OF
THE INDIVIDUAL AS A WHOLE PERSON. IT HAS BEEN THE AGENCY'S
EXPERIENCE THAT THERE IS NO TOOL AS EFFECTIVE AS THE POLYGRAPH
IN DEVELOPING THIS CLEAR, COMPLETE PICTURE.

MUCH AS BEEN SAID PRO AND CON ABOUT THE VALIDITY AND THE
RELIABILITY OF THE POLYGRAPH. THIS AREA DEFIES SIMPLISTIC
ANSWERS. THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS FOR THIS, I BELIEVE:

FIRST, POLYGRAPHY IN PRACTICE IS CONSIDERABLY MORE COMPLEX
THAN IS RECOGNIZED BY THE MAJORITY OF CRITICS. THOSE
OUTSIDE THE FIELD, NOT SCHOOLED IN ITS METHODOLOGY, OFTEN
PRESUME THAT IT IS A SIMPLE MECHANICAL PROCEDURES RATHER
THAN A HIGHLY TECHNICAL PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY. THIS
MISCONCEPTION HAS BEEN COMPOUNDED BY THE MEDIA AND BY TV
SHOWS SUCH AS "THE LIE DETECTOR." AS AN ANALOGY, HIGH
READINGS ON BLOOD PRESSURE MACHINES NOW FOUND IN SHOPPING
MALLS ARE NOT PROOF OF A DISEASE. IT TAKES A PHYSICIAN TO
ACCURATELY DIAGNOSE ILLNESS.

SECOND, CONTROLLED STUDIES TEND TO ADDRESS ONLY HIGHLY SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE POLYGRAPH PROCESS. BROAD GENERALIZATIONS FROM THESE STUDIES QUITE NATURALLY INVITE CONTROVERSY. MOREOVER, LABORATORY SETTINGS WHERE POLYGRAPH RESEARCH IS OFTEN DONE LACK THE MOST CRITICAL ELEMENT OF A VALID POLYGRAPH ENVIRONMENT, AND THAT IS THE REAL-LIFE FEAR OF DETECTION PRESENT WHEN A SUBJECT ATTEMPTS TO DECEIVE THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINER ABOUT A MATTER OF IMPORTANCE TO THE SUBJECT.

THIRD, THE PRACTICE OF POLYGRAPHY TAKES SEVERAL DIFFERENT FORMS, SUCH AS SINGLE-ISSUE CRIMINAL TESTING BY SAY, LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, EMPLOYEE SCREENING BY PRIVATE INDUSTRY, AND SPECIALIZED TESTINGS AS PRACTICED BY VARIOUS FEDERAL AGENCIES. ANY GENERALIZATIONS REGARDING THE USE OF THE POLYGRAPH IN ANY ONE OF THESE FORMS CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT APPLY TO ALL FORMS OF POLYGRAPHY.

FOURTH, MANY DISCUSSIONS OF POLYGRAPHY APPEAR TO TAKE PLACE IN AN EMOTIONALLY-LOADED ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH PARTICIPANTS FREQUENTLY SUPPORT A PRE-DETERMINED VIEWPOINT.

I WOULD PREFER IN THIS HEARING TO CONCENTRATE ON THE AGENCY'S EXPERIENCE WITH THE POLYGRAPH INTERVIEW AND CONCENTRATE ON ITS UTILITY AS A SECURITY TOOL. I AM REFLECTING

HERE ON THE AGENCY'S USE OF THE POLYGRAPH WHICH HAS EXTENDED FOR THE LAST 36 YEARS AND INCLUDES MORE THAN 120,000 CASES AND ALMOST ONE MILLION POLYGRAPH CHARTS. I CAN STATE WITHOUT RESERVATION THAT THE POLYGRAPH IS THE MOST PRODUCTIVE AND VALUABLE TECHNIQUE IN THE CIA PERSONNEL SECURITY ARENA. IT IS NOT INFALLIBLE AND IT IS NOT A PANACEA, BUT I WANT YOU TO CONSIDER ITS UTILITY AS REFLECTED IN THE FOLLOWING:

IN 1982, FOR EXAMPLE, THE POLYGRAPH DEVELOPED NEW AND SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION NOT SURFACED BY OTHER SCREENING DEVICES IN:

70 PERCENT OF THE ENTRANCE-ON-DUTY CASES,
25 PERCENT OF THE TRAIL-PERIOD CASES,
31 PERCENT OF THE REINVESTIGATION CASES, AND
43 PERCENT OF THE INDUSTRIAL CASES.

BEAR IN MIND THAT THESE STATISTICS REPRESENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW INFORMATION, NOT NECESSARILY CLEARANCE DENIAL NOR CLEARANCE REVOCATION.

IN A 1980 PERSONNEL SECURITY SURVEY PUBLISHED BY THE DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE AND SUBMITTED WITH MY WRITTEN MATERIALS, 507 CIA SECURITY CLEARANCE CASES WERE STUDIED. ALL OF THE CASES WERE COMPLETED BETWEEN OCTOBER 1, 1979 AND JANUARY 31, 1980. ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY OF THESE DID NOT INCLUDE A POLYGRAPH; 327 FEATURED THE POLYGRAPH. OF THE 180 CASES IN WHICH THE POLYGRAPH WAS NOT USED, INFORMATION OF SECURITY SIGNIFICANCE

WAS FOUND IN 37, OR 20.5 PERCENT. THE 327 CASES WITH POLYGRAPH RESULTED IN 199 (OR 60.8 PERCENT) CONTAINING INFORMATION OF SECURITY SIGNIFICANCE. THE DIFFERENCE IS DRAMATIC AND, TO MY MIND, STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE POLYGRAPH'S EFFECTIVENESS FOR SECURITY SCREENING PROGRAMS.

FOR THE YEARS 1978 THROUGH 1982, THERE WERE A TOTAL OF 1,785 CIA SECURITY DISAPPROVALS WHICH RESULTED FROM POLYGRAPH-DERIVED INFORMATION. THIS FIGURE REPRESENTS 89 PERCENT OF ALL SECURITY DISAPPROVALS ISSUED DURING THAT PERIOD. I SUBMIT THAT THIS FIGURE SUGGESTS A DISTURBING PROSPECT: 1,785 INDIVIDUALS WHO DID NOT MEET SECURITY STANDARDS FOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN ACCESS TO SUCH INFORMATION AT CIA HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE POLYGRAPH PROGRAM.

THE MOST IMPORTANT POINT TO MAKE ABOUT CIA SECURITY DISAPPROVAL CASES IS THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF THEM ARE BASED UPON INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE INDIVIDUAL DURING THE COURSE OF THE POLYGRAPH INTERVIEW. IN CASES WHERE DECEPTION IS DETECTED, THE EXAMINER WILL ENTER INTO A DISCUSSION WITH THE INDIVIDUAL TO OBTAIN AN EXPLANATION FOR HIS/HER REACTION. EVALUATION OF ANY INFORMATION THUS DEVELOPED THEN, SERVES AS THE BASIS FOR THE DISAPPROVAL ACTION RATHER THAN RELIANCE ON INDICATIONS OF DECEPTION ON THE POLYGRAPH CHARTS.

RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE INDIVIDUAL DURING THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION, THE CIA'S POLYGRAPH PROGRAM HAS BEEN CAREFULLY DESIGNED TO ENSURE THAT AN

EQUITABLE BALANCE EXISTS BETWEEN THE NEED OF THE AGENCY TO OBTAIN AND VERIFY INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION AND THE NEED TO AFFORD CERTAIN BASIC PROTECTIONS TO THE INDIVIDUAL. THE AGENCY DOES NOT POLYGRAPH U.S. PERSONS WITHOUT THEIR WRITTEN CONSENT. EACH INDIVIDUAL MUST SIGN A CONSENT FORM BEFORE THE POLYGRAPH TEST IS ADMINISTERED. THIS CONSENT FORM ENSURES THAT THE INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN APPRISED OF HIS OR HER RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, THAT ANY NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION OR INFORMATION RELATING TO VIOLATIONS OF LAW MAY BE REPORTED TO APPROPRIATE FEDERAL AGENCIES, AND THAT THE SESSION MAY BE MONITORED AND/OR RECORDED TO ENSURE ACCURACY AND COMPLIANCE WITH THESE SAFEGUARDS.

CAREFULLY DELINEATED PROCEDURES ALSO ENSURE THAT THE QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED DURING THE EXAMINATION ARE LIMITED TO THOSE NECESSARY TO RESOLVE SECURITY ISSUES. NO QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH DO NOT HAVE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS. EACH OF THE QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED IS REVIEWED WITH THE INDIVIDUAL PRIOR TO THE EXAMINATION, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IS AFFORDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE KNOWN IN ADVANCE ANY OBJECTIONS OR RELEVANT INFORMATION WHICH MIGHT AFFECT HIS OR HER ANSWER TO THE QUESTION. THE INDIVIDUAL, OF COURSE, MAY TERMINATE THE POLYGRAPH INTERVIEW AT ANY TIME.

SHOULD A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION RESULT IN EVIDENCE OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT, THIS INFORMATION IS STRICTLY CONTROLLED AND IS RELEASED ONLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF

EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND THE CLEAR INTEREST OF NATIONAL SECURITY AS EXPLICITLY AUTHORIZED EACH TIME IN WRITING BY THE DDCI. THERE ARE TWO WAYS IN WHICH THIS RELEASE OF INFORMATION OCCURS. UNDER THE CRIMES REPORTING PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333, EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS FEDERAL CRIMES SPECIFIED IN THOSE PROCEDURES IS REPORTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. THOSE PROCEDURES REQUIRE THAT THE RELEVANT INFORMATION BE FIRST REPORTED TO JUSTICE BY MEANS OF A "JOHN DOE" LETTER WITH AN IDENTIFYING CASE NUMBER. IN THE EVENT JUSTICE DECIDES TO FURTHER INVESTIGATE A PARTICULAR CASE, ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED AT THEIR REQUEST.

POLYGRAPH INFORMATION IS ALSO RELEASED IN A LIMITED AND CONTROLLED FASHION IN THE COURSE OF NATIONAL AGENCY CHECKS PERFORMED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450. OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES WITH NATIONAL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES MAY RUN A SECURITY CHECK ON ONE OF THEIR APPLICANTS BY ASKING THE AGENCY WHETHER WE HAVE ANY INFORMATION ON THAT INDIVIDUAL. IN THE EVENT THAT WE HAVE ^{noteworthy information developed from the} POLYGRAPHED ^{the} THIS INDIVIDUAL, WE COMMUNICATE ^{interview with} THE RESULTS OF THAT INTERVIEW TO THEM FOR LEAD PURPOSES AFTER THE DDCI HAS DETERMINED FROM SECURITY'S WRITTEN PETITION THAT THE PROVISION OF THIS INFORMATION IS REQUIRED IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL SECURITY. ADDITIONALLY, SHOULD THE AGENCY DEVELOP SPECIFIC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INFORMATION, THIS WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT AGENCY, AGAIN AFTER THE DDCI DETERMINES THAT THE TRANSFER OF INFORMATION IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY. 6

FINALLY, INsofar AS THE UTILITY OF THE POLYGRAPH IS CONCERNED, THE BEST EVIDENCE IS EXAMPLE. PERMIT ME TO SUMMARIZE THREE RECENT CASES IN WHICH THE POLYGRAPH PLAYED A CRUCIAL ROLE IN DEVELOPING AND CONFIRMING SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION:

EXAMPLE NUMBER ONE

OUR FIRST CASE INVOLVES AN INTELLIGENCE ANALYST WHO JOINED THE AGENCY FOLLOWING A FAVORABLE PRE-EMPLOYMENT INVESTIGATION AND POLYGRAPH INTERVIEW. DURING A REINVESTIGATION POLYGRAPH, THE EMPLOYEE ADMITTED DISCUSSING THE CONTENTS OF SECRET DOCUMENTS WITH THE SPOUSE, A NATURALIZED UNITED STATES CITIZEN. THE SPOUSE WORKED AT THE TIME AS A CONSULTANT FOR A FOREIGN EMBASSY, AND HAD AS A PRINCIPAL CONTACT A KNOWN OFFICER OF A HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. FOR THIS THE EMPLOYEE WAS OFFICIALLY REPRIMANDED.

DURING A FURTHER REINVESTIGATION POLYGRAPH INTERVIEW, THIS EMPLOYEE ADMITTED ADDITIONAL SIGNIFICANT, UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES TO BOTH THE SPOUSE AND TO FRIENDS. THIS EMPLOYEE FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGED HAVING HAD UNAUTHORIZED CONTACT WITH A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND HAVING REQUESTED ITS ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING CERTAIN RESEARCH MATERIALS. THE EMPLOYEE ALSO ADMITTED DURING THIS POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION HAVING DISCUSSED CERTAIN CLASSIFIED TECHNICAL COLLECTION CAPABILITIES WITH SEVERAL UNCLEARED FRIENDS. ADDITIONALLY, DISCLOSURES TO THE SPOUSE INVOLVED ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY

INTELLIGENCE. FINALLY, AND OF PARTICULAR CONCERN, WAS THE EMPLOYEE'S ADMISSION OF HAVING TOLD THE SPOUSE THAT THE SPOUSE'S CLIENT WAS AFFILIATED WITH A HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. THE INFORMATION ELICITED BY THE POLYGRAPH INTERVIEW PROVIDED A MORE THAN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR THE AGENCY TO TAKE ACTION IN THIS CASE. GIVEN THE HISTORY OF REPEATED UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE VIOLATIONS AND THE SPOUSE'S DUTIES AND INTERACTION WITH HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OFFICIALS, THE EMPLOYEE WAS ASKED TO RESIGN IN LIEU OF TERMINATION AND DID SO.

EXAMPLE NUMBER TWO

THE NEXT CASE CONCERNS A MILITARY DETAILEE WHO WAS ASSIGNED TO THE NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER (NPIC) FACILITY TO PERFORM CLERICAL DUTIES. THIS INDIVIDUAL HAD AT ONE TIME WORKED FOR THE AGENCY, BUT HAD LEFT TO ENTER THE ARMED SERVICES AND WAS ON ACTIVE MILITARY DUTY WHEN DETAILED TO NPIC. WHILE AT NPIC, THE INDIVIDUAL HAD A TOP SECRET CLEARANCE AND WAS PROVIDED ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION. DURING A PERIODIC REINVESTIGATION POLYGRAPH, THE INDIVIDUAL REVEALED CERTAIN FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES AND WAS REFERRED TO THE AGENCY'S PERSONAL AFFAIRS BRANCH TO OBTAIN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. IT WAS DISCLOSED DURING FOLLOW-UP REINVESTIGATION POLYGRAPHS THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL PROVIDED CLASSIFIED INFORMATION WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION TO A FOREIGN SECURITY SERVICE. FURTHER, THE INDIVIDUAL ADMITTED TAKING UNCLEARED FRIENDS INTO A SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION

FACILITY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, AND EXPLAINING TO THEM THE CLASSIFIED MISSION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INSTALLATION.

BASED UPON THESE FACTS, THIS EMPLOYEE WAS ASKED TO RESIGN IN LIEU OF TERMINATION AND DID SO.

EXAMPLE NUMBER THREE

THE LAST CASE INVOLVES AN INDIVIDUAL WHO JOINED THE AGENCY IN THE 1950'S FOLLOWING A FAVORABLE PRE-EMPLOYMENT INVESTIGATION AND POLYGRAPH INTERVIEW AND SERVED AS A CASE OFFICER OVERSEAS. PRIOR TO TAKING A REINVESTIGATION POLYGRAPH, THIS INDIVIDUAL LEFT THE AGENCY TO PURSUE PRIVATE BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES. FOLLOWING THE FAILURE OF THESE VARIOUS BUSINESS VENTURES, THIS INDIVIDUAL CONTACTED A HOSTILE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OFFICER KNOWN FROM EARLIER AGENCY SERVICE. IN ORDER TO RECOUP THE FINANCIAL LOSSES, THE INDIVIDUAL AGREED TO PROVIDE THIS FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER WITH INFORMATION CONCERNING THE INDIVIDUAL'S CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES WITH THE AGENCY, AS WELL AS THE IDENTITIES OF CERTAIN FORMER AGENCY COLLEAGUES. THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER THEN URGED THE INDIVIDUAL TO REAPPLY TO THE AGENCY, BUT THE INDIVIDUAL REFUSED TO DO SO FOR FEAR OF TAKING A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION. THIS WAS LEARNED FROM THE INDIVIDUAL DURING AN INTERVIEW CONDUCTED FOLLOWING CONVICTION FOR ESPIONAGE. WHILE THE AGENCY THUS SUFFERED CERTAIN UNAVOIDABLE DAMAGE IN THIS

CASE, THE POLYGRAPH PROVED INVALUABLE IN PREVENTING FURTHER INJURY BY SERVING AS A FORMIDABLE OBSTACLE THE INDIVIDUAL'S REEMPLOYMENT AT THE AGENCY.

THE STATISTICS CITED EARLIER AS WELL AS THESE CASE EXAMPLES SPEAK CONVINCINGLY FOR THE UTILITY OF THE POLYGRAPH PROCESS. I CERTAINLY HAVE NO ARGUMENT WITH THOSE WHO WISH TO SEE MORE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ON POLYGRAPHY, BUT I DO HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY WITH THOSE WHO CONCLUDE THAT THIS PROCESS DOES NOT WORK OR THAT IT IS TOO LITTLE UNDERSTOOD TODAY EVEN TO BE USED.

IN CLOSING, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE OUR USE AND EXPERIENCE WITH THE POLYGRAPH OVER THE LAST 36 YEARS: WE HAVE FOUND THAT WITH CAREFULLY-CHOSEN EXAMINERS AND A THOUGHTFULLY-STRUCTURED AND TIGHTLY-CONTROLLED PROGRAM, THE POLYGRAPH IS AN EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE TOOL IN PROTECTING THE AGENCY FROM UNSUITABLE INDIVIDUALS WHO WOULD CLEARLY POSE AN UNACCEPTABLE SECURITY RISK. AT THE SAME TIME, THE POLYGRAPH HAS BEEN SHOWN TO BE VERY HELPFUL IN DETECTING AS PART OF OUR REINVESTIGATION EFFORTS THAT RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF AGENCY EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE BECOME SECURITY RISKS SINCE ENTERING ON DUTY. FINALLY, THE POLYGRAPH HAS EXONERATED SOME OF OUR PEOPLE WHO WERE ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN A RISK OR TO HAVE COMMITTED SOME SORT OF WRONGDOING.

I HOPE THAT MY REMARKS WILL BE USEFUL TO YOU DURING YOUR DELIBERATIONS. I WOULD BE HAPPY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.